SA Heritage Resources Agency et al v Dr Makaziwe Mandela et al (15867/2022) (4 December 2023)

This case considers the importance of national heritage and its preservation.

The S A Heritage Resource Agency (“SAHRA”) sought interdictory relief stopping First and Fourth Respondents and their agents selling outside SA any of 29 items (“the Mandela Objects”) that it had declared to be heritage objects in terms of s 32(2) of the National Heritage Resources Act, 1999 (“the Act”) until they had first repatriated those items from the USA to SA and obtained an export permit from SAHRA for their re-exportation.

It also sought an order directing the First and Fourth Respondent and their agents to take all reasonable steps to ensure the repatriation of these Mandela Objects back to SA within 30 days of the order, and report to it in writing when this has been done.

The First Respondent – a daughter to the late President Mandela – launched a counter-application for the review and setting aside of SAHRA’s decision to declare the Mandela Objects as “heritage objects”, and an order that the Applicants jointly and severally pay the costs of her counter-application for such review, including the costs of senior and junior counsel. She also sought the dismissal of SAHRA’s application with costs.

The counter-application hinged on the belief that SAHRA declared the Mandela Objects specifically as heritage objects, and not under the broad category of types of objects as envisaged in s 32(2) of the Act.

The Fourth Respondent – President Mandela’s former gaoler-turned-friend – made common cause with the First Respondent’s counter-application for the review and setting aside of SAHRA’s alleged decision to declare each of the Mandela Objects specifically as heritage objects. He also sought dismissal of SAHRA’s application for interdictory relief against him.

No relief was sought against any of the other Respondents.

The court considered 3 issues:

  • Jurisdiction where one of the Respondents is resident outside its area of jurisdiction.
  • Whether the Mandela Objects are heritage objects within the contemplation of the Act.
  • The First Respondent’s counter-application for the review of SAHRA’s decision to declare the Mandela Objects heritage objects.


The Respondents challenged the jurisdiction of the court on the ground that the Fourth Respondent is resident outside the area of its jurisdiction. This point was rejected. The court reasoned that SAHRA’s interdictory relief is sought against the First Respondent (resident in Gauteng) in relation to some of the Mandela Objects, and against the Fourth Respondent (resident in the Western Cape) in relation to others. Conceivably, SAHRA could have launched these proceedings in the Western Cape High Court where the Fourth Respondent is resident. But then the First Respondent could conceivably have raised the same jurisdiction point that the Fourth Respondent raises.

The court reasoned further that it is now a legal position of some long standing that when a Division of the High Court has a matter before it that could also have been brought in another Division, it has no power to refuse to hear the matter, except where considerations of abuse of process are in play [Goldberg v Goldberg 1938 WLD 83 at 85–86; Standard Credit Corporation Ltd v Bester and Others 1987 (1) SA 812 (W), at 817J – 819E]. Thus, SAHRA had a choice to initiate these proceedings either in the Western Cape High Court or in the Pretoria High Court. It chose to do so in the Pretoria High Court. It was entitled to do so. That choice having been made, the Pretoria High Court has no power to refuse to entertain the matter in the absence of an abuse of process claim [TMT Services & Supplies (Pty) Ltd v MEC, Department of Transport, KZN & Others 2022 (4) SA 583 (SCA), at paras 30-35]. No abuse of process claim has been made.

It reasoned further that in any event it has jurisdiction over any person who, being outside its area of jurisdiction, is joined in a cause over which it has jurisdiction [Superior Courts Act, s 21(2)]. Since the Fourth Respondent, being outside the court’s area of jurisdiction, is joined in a cause over which the court has jurisdiction (by reason of its jurisdiction over the First Respondent), the court has jurisdiction over him.

Heritage Objects

On whether the Mandela Objects are heritage objects as contemplated in the Act, the court reasoned as follows:

  • The long title and preamble of the Act provide much insight into what type of object should be declared a heritage object. These are objects that “define our cultural identity”; objects on which the country’s spiritual well-being and nation-building depends; objects that “shape our national character”, objects that deepen our understanding of one another, and facilitate national healing from the ravages of apartheid and material and symbolic restitution.
  • Section 3(1) of the Act considers and recognises only heritage resources “which are of cultural significance or other special value” as falling within the philosophy and reach of the Act. A “cultural significance or other special value” is conferred by the object’s (a) importance in the community, or pattern of South Africa’s history; (b) its possession of uncommon, rare or endangered aspects of South Africa’s natural or cultural heritage; (c) its potential to yield information that will contribute to an understanding of South Africa’s natural or cultural heritage; (d) its importance in demonstrating the principal characteristics of a particular class of South Africa’s natural or cultural places or objects; (e) its importance in exhibiting particular aesthetic characteristics valued by a community or cultural group; (f) its importance in demonstrating a high degree of creative or technical achievement at a particular period; (g) its strong or special association with a particular community or cultural group for social, cultural or spiritual reasons; (h) its strong or special association with the life or work of a person, group or organisation of importance in the history of South Africa; and (i) sites of significance relating to the history of slavery in South Africa [s 3(3)].
  • Section 5(3), which deals with general principles for heritage resource management, says the laws, procedures and administrative practices by which heritage resources are managed must be “clear and generally available to those affected thereby”.
  • Section 32(1), which deals specifically with “heritage objects”, says an object or collection of objects, or a type of object or list of objects – whether specific or generic – that is part of the national estate [as defined in s 3], and the export of which SAHRA deems it necessary to control, may be declared a heritage object. Section 32(2) says “For the purposes of this section, an object within a type of objects declared to be a heritage object is deemed to be a heritage object”. This is the provision that SAHRA invokes for its argument that it has declared the Mandela Objects “as a type of object” that fits the definition of “national estate” in s 3, generically and not individually or specifically.
  • Section 32(19) prohibits the export of a heritage object without SAHRA’s export permit, and section 32(20) prohibits the removal of a heritage object from South Africa other than through a customs port of entry.
  • Of the types of heritage resources enumerated in the gazette of 18 April 2019, SAHRA lay emphasis on:

“3.3   Objects assessed according to criteria in S32(24) if the NHRA and identified as being of cultural, historical or aesthetic significance, whether originating in South Africa or elsewhere, that have been in South Africa for more than 50 years which includes … [3.3.13] Awards and associated memorabilia associated with significant figures awarded in South Africa or awarded to South Africans            …

3.5     Objects related to significant political processes, events, figures and leaders in South Africa.

3.6.    Objects related to significant South Africans, including but not limited to: writers, artists, musicians, scientists, academics, educators, engineers and clerics as well as events of national importance.”

  • Section 32(19) of the Act, when read together with s 51(1)(a), is a penal provision. While the conduct that it proscribes is clear and unambiguous (“No person may export or attempt to export from South Africa any heritage object without a permit issued by SAHRA”), it is far from clear how far the “heritage object” net spreads. Put differently, the language that describes a “heritage object” in the Act, and the regulations that SAHRA invokes, is so overbroad that just about anything that President Mandela touched, or is “associated” with, or “related to” him, can be considered a heritage object. That – and considering the clear intention to confine heritage resources to objects of national significance, as demonstrated by the language of the long title and preamble – could not have been the legislature’s intention.
  • SAHRA deemed the Mandela Objects to be heritage objects by regulation published on 18 April 2019. It did so pursuant to s 32(2) of the Act which says: “For the purposes of this section, an object within a type of objects declared to be a heritage object is deemed to be a heritage object”. One example of types of objects declared by SAHRA to be heritage objects under the section is: “Objects related to significant political processes, events, figures and leaders in South Africa” [Regulation 3.5 in GG 42407 of 18 April 2019]. Section 3(3)(h) confers that status on objects which have “strong or special association with the life or work of a person … of importance in the history of South Africa”.
  • While there is no question that President Mandela was a significant political figure, a significant leader and a person of importance in the history of South Africa, tens or hundreds of Springbok Rugby jerseys or ruling party attire autographed by President Mandela on the campaign trail, or tens or hundreds of copies of his book “Long Walk to Freedom” autographed by him over the years – although “related to” a significant South African, a significant political process, a significant political event, and a significant political figure – could not (when considered within the broad context of the Act as a whole, its long title and its preamble) have been intended by the legislature to be regarded as heritage objects. The description simply does not satisfy the general principle in section 5(3) of the Act that the law by which heritage resources are managed must be “clear and generally available to those affected thereby”. For that reason, it would be unpardonably louche of the court to expose the First and Fourth Respondents to a possible criminal sanction in these circumstances [S v Toms; S v Bruce 1990 (2) SA 802 (A), at 808A-C]. Given their ordinary grammatical meaning, phrases like “related to” and “associated with”, when used to describe objects for purposes of bringing those objects within the net of heritage objects, are so wide as would court an absurdity.
  • But even when considering the purpose and context for which the Act was enacted, there is no reasonable measure by which all 29 items can – holus bolus and by a simple act of declaration, even after a process of public consultation – be deemed to be heritage objects as envisaged in the Act. This is because the long title and preamble make plain that not every object that is merely “related to” or “associated with” a significant political event or process or person is a heritage object. On a purposive and contextual reading of the Act through the prism of its long title and preamble, the object must, for example, (1) be a resource of national significance; (2) be instrumental in the nurturing and conservation of a legacy worthy of being bequeathed to future generations; (3) be unique and precious in a manner that cannot be renewed; (4) help us to define our cultural identity; (5) lie at the heart of our spiritual well-being; (6) foster in us the power to build our nation; (7) have the potential to affirm our diverse cultures; (8) shape our national character; (9) contribute to redressing past inequities; (10) educate, deepen our understanding of society and encourage us to empathise with the experience of others; (11) facilitate healing and material and symbolic restitution; and (12) promote new and previously neglected research into our rich oral traditions and customs.
  • On these lofty ideals, it is difficult to imagine how a pair of sunglasses and an autographed book fit the mould described here.

Counter-application: Review

As regards the counter-application, the court dismissed it on the ground that SAHRA plainly did not make the decision sought to be set aside. It declared the Mandela Objects as heritage objects under the broad sweep of s 32(2) as types of objects and not – as contended for by the First Respondent – specifically and individually as heritage objects. That declaration came in the form of the regulations finally published in the gazette of 18 April 2022 after following the process described in s 32(5)(b), not s 32(5)(a) which applies where declaration is specific to an object or item. This is clear from the undisputed facts. There is thus no decision of the kind alleged by the First Respondent. Consequently, there is nothing to review and set aside.


On costs, the court said there is no reason why costs should not follow the cause in both applications.

It found that the review application was a “Hail Mary” It reasoned that, judging by the clear terms of the founding affidavit that point indisputably to a declaration not of each individual item as a heritage object but of the declaration of the list of types of heritage resources, the review application should not have been brought. Regrettably, the First Respondent persisted in this exercise even after this was confirmed in SAHRA’s subsequent affidavits. SAHRA should not have been put by the First Respondent to the unnecessary cost of producing a rule 53 record and resisting a clearly ill-conceived application.

In the circumstances, the court considered it fair that the costs in SAHRA’s interdict application and those in the First Respondent’s review application should cancel each other out.

The court found that the Fourth Respondent, while making common ground with the First Respondent, is in a different position. He did not seek a record, and Counsel did not press the review with vigour in argument but focused on the main question of whether the two items pertaining to the Fourth Respondent are truly heritage objects as envisaged in the Act. It found that he is entitled to his costs in resisting SAHRA’s application without pressing the counter-application. Those costs are to include the costs of junior Counsel (as Senior Counsel appeared pro bono) and the disbursements of Senior Counsel.


In the result, the court dismissed SAHRA’s interdict application and ordered that it, jointly and severally with the Second and Third Respondents, pay the Fourth Respondent’s costs, including the costs of Junior Counsel (but not of Senior Counsel who appears pro bono) and the disbursements of Senior Counsel. It also dismissed the First Respondent’s counter-application.

Read Full Judgement here –>SA Heritage Resources Agency et al v Makaziwe Mandela et al – 01 December 2023 Final

By |2023-12-20T19:07:51+02:00December 20th, 2023|High Court, Judgements, Ngalwana judgements|Comments Off on SA Heritage Resources Agency et al v Dr Makaziwe Mandela et al (15867/2022) (4 December 2023)

Mogoai et al v City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality (120856/2023) (4 December 2023)

T his case considers what a court’s options are when confronted with a set of facts that call for vindication of the rule of law in urgent court but in circumstances where urgency is discounted by the applicants’ own conduct.
In other words, when there is tension between lack of urgency in urgent court, on the one hand, and the need to vindicate the rule of law and the Constitution on an urgent basis, on the other, is striking the application from the roll for lack of urgency the proper approach?
Read Full Judgement here –> Mogoai et al v City of Tshwane – 4 December 2023 

By |2023-12-20T11:40:20+02:00December 20th, 2023|High Court, Judgements, Ngalwana judgements|Comments Off on Mogoai et al v City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality (120856/2023) (4 December 2023)


Facts Matter.

The South African public’s understanding of the long-running spat between the Cape Judge President, on the one hand, and Justices of the Constitutional Court acting as an institutional block, on the other, seems informed by much factual ellipsis.

In this short paper, I try to present some of the facts that, in my assessment, seem to have disappeared from public discourse on this case, resulting in some members of the public and analysts making some of the most extraordinary statements about the case. In the process I make some of my own observations about those facts which, if considered, may in my assessment possibly have resulted in a different outcome from the one recently reached by the Judicial Conduct Tribunal of the South African Judicial Service Commission on 9 April 2021.

In writing this paper, I am moved by a concern about the dominant fact-free narrative that seems to be treated as authoritative in public commentary on this case. My purpose, therefore, as the Code of Conduct for Legal Practitioners allows, is to help guide public understanding of the issues that have arisen or may yet arise in the course of the further conduct of this process, if any should follow.

As you read this paper, be aware that I was part of the Judge President’s legal team in 2008 until April 2009.

Read the Analysis here The Judge President vs Justices of the Constitutional Court – What are the Missing Facts PDF

By |2021-04-13T01:21:02+02:00April 13th, 2021|Analyses and Reviews|2 Comments


Radical Economic Transformation is anchored in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. Pieces of legislation have been passed in order to give effect to it. The President of South Africa pronounced it in his State of the Nation Address. Yet, the term “Radical Economic Transformation” has become something of a swear word in recent years in South Africa. This raises the question: Why?

This short paper explores this question and more.

Read the full Analysis here RET – A Constitutional Perspective – Website

By |2021-04-07T15:28:36+02:00April 7th, 2021|Analyses and Reviews|2 Comments

Déjà Vu FOR SOUTH AFRICA’s CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY: HAVE THE PRESIDENTIAL VOTE OF NO CONFIDENCE CHICKENS COME HOME TO ROOST? – By Vuyani Ngalwana SC, Fellow of the Africa Leadership Initiative & Fellow of the Aspen Global Leadership Network

On Thursday 3 December 2020, the South African National Assembly is scheduled to entertain a vote of no confidence motion in the President. The motion was submitted some months ago by the African Transformation Movement (“ATM”) – a minority party in the National Assembly. It requested that the vote be done by secret ballot. The Speaker of the National Assembly, the upper house, refused. ATM demurred and has reportedly given the Speaker until close of business on Monday 30 November 2020 to reconsider her decision or face legal challenge.

Whether that legal challenge will come is anyone’s guess. Should it come, though, the very foundation of South Africa’s relatively nascent constitutional democracy is likely to be tested. And that’s a good thing.

South Africa has been here before, except on that occasion the Speaker asserted that she had no power to direct that a vote of no confidence in the President be done by secret ballot. She was mistaken. The Constitutional Court set her right and told her she does have a discretion so to direct. It armed her with a myriad factors that must be taken into account in the exercise of that discretion. In the end, the Speaker, on that occasion, relented and directed a vote by secret ballot.

The Constitutional Court judgment was in June 2017. The President narrowly survived the secret ballot no confidence vote in August 2017. Another vote of no confidence was scheduled for late February 2018. The President avoided that secret ballot judgment of his peers. He resigned on Valentine’s Day 2018.

Over 3 years later since the last no confidence vote, another President is facing the same hurdle and the Speaker’s decision looks likely to be challenged – again. This time, though, the applicable principles are clear.

Given that money has increasingly taken centre-stage during this President’s term in office, and at least two Members from the opposition benches have been outed as having received money from the President’s 2017 campaign funds the records of which remain sealed by order of court, it seems unlikely that the Speaker has applied her mind fully to the dangers that her decision to refuse a secret ballot poses to a conscience-laden exercise of each Member’s vote in that no confidence vote.

The Constitutional Court’s observations in paragraphs 81 and 82 in UDM v The Speaker and Others (CCT 89/17) [2017] ZACC 21; 2017 (8) BCLR 1061 (CC); 2017 (5) SA 300 (CC) (22 June 2017) [“the Secret Ballot Case] – regarding money or oiled hands determining the voting outcome”, and the voting process degenerating into a fear or money-inspired sham” – are particularly chilling, especially with the ever-looming spectre of the firmly sealed records of donations to this President’s 2017 election campaign in which records the names of many Members of Parliament – both those of his own party and those of opposition parties – could be featuring prominently, and likely to vote gratitude to the President for the largesse s/he may have received than conscience.

The stakes are high and should expose real (not imagined or rhetorical) fissures – if they ever genuinely exist between chameleon-esque politicians. In terms of s 102(2) of the South African Constitution, if the vote of no confidence in the President succeeds by a simple majority of 201 of the 400 Members of the National Assembly, the President and his entire cabinet (including deputy ministers) must resign. For that to happen, at least 33 ruling party Members must vote in favour of the motion and ALL opposition parties must also vote in favour.

Read the full Analysis here Deja Vu For Constitutional Democracy in South Africa

By |2020-11-28T20:02:34+02:00November 28th, 2020|Analyses and Reviews|1 Comment

Request for Oral Evidence of Zuma Cabinet et al at the Zondo Commission- By Vuyani Ngalwana SC, Fellow of the Africa Leadership Initiative & Fellow of the Aspen Global Leadership Network

On 25 January 2018, the President of the Republic of South Africa established the eponymously titled Zondo Commission to inquire into “state capture”, corruption and fraud in the public sector including organs of state.

Rules and Regulations were then gazetted to regulate the proceedings and processes of the Zondo Commission.

One of those Rules is Rule 9.1 which affords every person the right to request the Commission to invite any person to give evidence at the Commission on specific issues that fall within the Terms of Reference of the Commission. Another is Rule 3.2 which confers upon the legal team (or evidence leaders) of the Commission to question persons who appear at the Commission as witnesses.

Rule 9.1 is important as it fosters participatory democracy and active citizenship particularly on matters of national interest such as the fight against corruption that seems endemic in South Africa if media reports are any indication. It ensures that the Commission cannot train its sights only on people carefully selected by it (for whatever reason) for investigation to the exclusion of others who are implicated in alleged corrupt conduct.

Where any person believes that persons not called by the Commission to give evidence and be questioned on matters of alleged corruption, “state capture” or fraud, that person is free to ask the Commission to invite such persons to be questioned by the Commission.

This request is intended as an example of how to go about doing so. If there are people you believe should be called to appear at the Commission, you have a right to do so by this means. The Chair, however, has a discretion whether or not to acquiesce in your request. As with the exercise of any judicial discretion, he is duty bound to exercise it judiciously and not capriciously as that may found a ground for the review and setting aside of his decision not to invite the witness, or the setting aside of his entire report for ignoring relevant evidence in coming to his findings and recommendations.

Among the persons in relation to whom the Request has been made are the President, former Deputy-President, former executives at state owned enterprises and current and former senior public service employees.

The Request includes video material that should be helpful to the Commission Chair in the assessment of the Request.

Read the full Request here Request for Oral Evidence by entire Cabinet as Witnesses to State Capture Commission – 24 November 2020

Related Documents

State Capture Terms of Reference – Original

State Capture Commission Rules

By |2020-11-26T15:44:42+02:00November 26th, 2020|Analyses and Reviews|Comments Off on Request for Oral Evidence of Zuma Cabinet et al at the Zondo Commission- By Vuyani Ngalwana SC, Fellow of the Africa Leadership Initiative & Fellow of the Aspen Global Leadership Network

The Zondo Commission Regulations Amendment: A Looming Constitutional Crisis? By Adv Gcina Malindi SC, Pan African Bar Association of South Africa

On 28 July 2020, the President of the Republic of South Africa gazetted some amendments to the Regulations of the Zondo Commission.

These amendments include enabling the National Prosecuting Authority to access information that has been gathered by investigators of the Zondo Commission, during the course of their employment by the Zondo Commission, and using that information in criminal proceedings against persons implicated by that information in criminal conduct.

Adv Malindi SC explores the constitutional challenges that these amendments pose. For example, if a witness called to give evidence at the Zondo Commission at a time when s/he is facing criminal prosecution, what implications does that have on the right against self-incrimination, among other rights of an accused person, if the Zondo Commission compels the person facing such criminal prosecution nevertheless to give evidence before it?

Read the full paper here Zondo Commission and Criminal Prosecution

By |2021-09-05T10:44:11+02:00September 13th, 2020|Analyses and Reviews|Comments Off on The Zondo Commission Regulations Amendment: A Looming Constitutional Crisis? By Adv Gcina Malindi SC, Pan African Bar Association of South Africa

Covid-19 Regulations vs Students: A Critical Analysis of Judgment in Leave to Appeal. By Thabo Nongogo BA(Law)(English Lit) UCT

On 4 August 2020, the Western Cape High Court, in Cape Town, South Africa (the Cape High Court), granted leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal, the second highest court in the South African hierarchy of courts.

The Cape High Court comprised two Judges. Reading the judgment, one got a sense that there was no appetite to grant leave. Extraordinarily, in a 43-paragraph judgment, it only emerges in paragraph 41 that leave may be granted.

This is an analysis of the judgment by a recent BA(Law) graduate student from the University of Cape Town. He laments the judgment as an opportunity lost to dealing with procedural and substantive rationality from a constitutional perspective, and hopes that the SCA gets to grips with that question.

Read the full paper here Analysis of LTA Esau Judgment – Thabo Nongogo 19 August 2020 Website

By |2020-08-19T15:47:35+02:00August 19th, 2020|Analyses and Reviews|1 Comment

To Fact Check Or Not: The Ethics of Journalism in South Africa

Many people at the receiving end of media focus on the basis of information obtained from “sources” about them are often at a loss as regards how it can possibly be permissible for a journalist to publish information about them without ever having spoken to them to check the accuracy of the information.

Not so long ago, the South African Minister of Finance found himself in that position when a headline in a Sunday newspaper screamed:

“Tito Really Wants Out”

He tweeted that the newspaper had not spoken to him for the story. The story itself did not cite “official” sources. It consisted entirely of inferences from the Minister’s past tweets.

In another more recent story, an online publication published a story quoting the Chairman of the South African Medical Research Council as saying cases of malnutrition at Chris Hani Baragwanath Academic Hospital were seen “for the first time” in May 2020 amid the hard lockdown imposed ostensibly to combat covid-19 in South Africa. The publication had not fact checked the assertion because, said the editor

“What she says matters and is deserving of publicity.”

The malnutrition story was subsequently disputed by the Minister of Health in an official cri de coeur, resulting in the publication issuing an ex post facto  “clarification”, with the editor later tweeting that he did not have to do a fact check since the person in question was an authority.

There appears to be disagreement among media experts on this view. One media expert and fact-checker is quoted as saying in a tweet:

“I strongly disagree. Journalists aren’t scribes. And no expert gets it right all the time. At the very least, the journalist should have established if Prof Gray had direct knowledge of the claim she was making about child malnutrition at Bara … The kind of journalism that publishes unverified claims and correct them later is not the kind of journalism that will help the industry build trust…”

So, what exactly are the ethics of fact checking in South African journalism?

This paper explores that question and finds the answer at the highest possible echelons of South African journalism, the South African Press Appeal Panel.

Read Full Analysis and Review here:To Fact Check or Not – Journalism and Ethics in South Africa

By |2020-05-27T00:04:33+02:00May 26th, 2020|Analyses and Reviews|Comments Off on To Fact Check Or Not: The Ethics of Journalism in South Africa

Do the Covid-19 Regulations Pass the Constitutionality and Rationality Test in South Africa?

In the wake of the Covid-19 pandemic that has, reportedly, decimated populations around the world, the South African government came up with far-reaching interventions ostensibly to “flatten the curve” of the infection rate of this pandemic in the country.

This paper explores the constitutionality and rationality of some of those interventions. The two principal questions it asks – and seeks to answer – are

  • why has government elected to anchor its intervention to fight a virus in the Disaster Management Act which seems designed to deal with other types of disasters?
  • what is the rational connection between some of these interventions, on the one hand, and purposes specifically set out in the empowering legislation, on the other?

Along the way, an attempt is made at addressing some of the arguments that have been advanced in defence of the measures that government has taken to “flatten the curve” of Covid-19 infections.

Read the full paper here Covid-19-Regulations-Rationality-and-Constitutionality FINAL1

By |2020-05-10T14:03:08+02:00May 1st, 2020|Analyses and Reviews|2 Comments
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